

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

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Relation Between NII 160, SKB 833, and NII 380

1. the relations and activities of Institute 160, and SKB 833 (the Special Construction Bureau), and NII 380. The former two were in Fryazino, and NII 380 in Leningrad, when the German group first arrived. NII stands for the Russian words meaning "Scientific Research Institute". In regard to NII 380, the official written designation of the Institute also included the Russian words for "All-Union" in front of the three words above. The

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25 YEAR RE-REVIEW

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STATE	#x	ARMY	#x	NAVY	#x	AIR	#x	FBI		AEC	CGI/PE ev	x	ORR/I ev	x
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Institute was never referred to as the All-Union Scientific Research Institute for Television Development. [redacted] it is a general Soviet policy that no title applied to a facility shall reveal the scope of its work program.

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2. Institute 160 [redacted] in Fryazino, was engaged in the production and development of vacuum tubes (including high vacuum types), iconoscopes, and magnetrons. During this period, the facilities of this Institute and the Special Construction Bureau [redacted] were located in the same buildings but were quite separate. SKB 833 worked on television developments. 25X1
3. During the war NII 380 had been moved from Leningrad to some location behind the Urals and, when hostilities ceased, the Soviets began to gradually transfer the Institute's equipment back to Leningrad. At first this equipment was placed in a building on Lesnoy Prospect (the street address is between 11 and 19) and SKB 833 in Fryazino began to supply the Institute with plans and materials so that the latter could begin parallel development work on television projects. It was found, however, that, at the time this help was being given to NII 380 by SKB 833, the former was not yet at a technological and organizational level to enable it to make full use of this support. Accordingly, SKB 833 was first made a branch of NII 380 around the end of 1947 and it was moved to Leningrad in April of 1948. About the time that SKB 833 was declared a branch of NII 380 [redacted] the yearly budget for the SKB was 1,500,000 rubles. It was actually a rather small operation. 25X1
4. At the beginning of 1949 a new building was assigned to NII 380. This was on Fontanka Street, number 6. By that time the so-called "Secret Department" was occupying the third and fourth floors in the "Lesnoy" Branch while the administrative offices were on the first floor and the civilian television work was being done on the second. When the Fontanka building was obtained, the civil departments began to move there. Rooms that became free in "Lesnoy" were then taken over by the "Secret Department". This move was gradual because much repair work had to be done at Fontanka. [redacted] the "Secret Department" will eventually completely occupy the "Lesnoy" Branch while civilian television developments will be exclusively performed in Fontanka. 25X1
5. [redacted] the third and fourth floor operations at "Lesnoy" were the heart of the entire Institute. They were closely guarded and no German was ever admitted to them. If any problems came up in the work done in that area, the Soviet engineers came to the Germans. Actually it appeared [redacted] such contacts were few; [redacted] the Soviets were given explicit instructions not to contact the Germans except in the case of extreme emergency or only on complex problems. 25X1
6. [redacted] this "Secret Department" was not responsible to any other Institute. There was, of course, much coordination between this department and the services -- Navy and Air Force officers going into this area, in order [redacted] to familiarize themselves with the military equipments being worked on there. MOYSEYEV seemed 25X1

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to have complete control of the "Secret Department".

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Further Information on Development of the "Tonne" System at NII 380

7. During the last few months of operation at Tannwald, after the end of the war, a large number of "Tonne" sets were removed by the Soviets and sent to the USSR. [redacted] the majority of these sets must have gone to NII 380 in Leningrad, because [redacted] work on the "Tonne" system was being done there [redacted]

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8. It is well established that only Soviet components will be employed in further development of the "Tonne" and "Seedorf" equipment. These will not give any advanced capabilities to the equipment; and the use of such equipment will be pretty much the same as that contemplated in Germany. [redacted] the Soviets cannot develop a system using the "Tonne" equipment as a basis which will have an advanced capability. [redacted]

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9. One of the factors which will certainly limit the Soviets in their ability to develop new systems will be the quality of their engineering personnel. According to USSR standards, [redacted] the scientists [redacted] at NII 380 were capable, but the Germans would have rated them "middle class". [redacted]

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Production Capabilities of NII 380

10. NII 380 could not be used under any circumstances for serial production of equipment items since all facilities are far too small. It was strictly a development organization. For instance, the monthly quota for the production of iconoscopes was 30, and to get this many good tubes the Institute had to build eight to ten times that many. Once a set of sweep generators was ordered from NII 380 by an unknown facility. A production run of 100 was planned and they were built over a one-and-one-half to two-year period. For each of these sweep generators the Institute received 40,000 rubles.

Further Comments on Development Conferences

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11. At regular intervals, about 30 Soviet experts [redacted] got together at [redacted]

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different places in the Soviet Union to discuss the development of television equipment. On several occasions the group met in Leningrad. Germans were allowed to go to these meetings on only one occasion; this was to a meeting held in Moscow in 1947.

12. These meetings were held for the purpose of coordinating development effort and to set the direction in which further development should go. [] the group was empowered to, and did, go into all new developments in the field. [] this group had no influence on, or connection with, production activities except perhaps to weed out obsolete products.

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Moscow-Leningrad Coaxial Cable

14. Regarding the Moscow-Leningrad coaxial cable, [] the section from Moscow to Kalinin was finished in early 1952, because in May of that year Soviet engineers in charge of testing the line and making measurements of its electrical characteristics []. The entire project was also supposed to be completed by the end of 1952.

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15. The line consisted of two coaxial tubes only and had no telephone pairs. []

[] The cable is planned for television transmission only, although it could naturally be used for other types of transmissions. All of the terminal equipment for the Moscow-Kalinin section of this line is in place. []

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[] Among the equipment removed from Germany by the Soviets was a great deal of underground coaxial cable which could very easily have served as a model for the manufacture of this Soviet cable.

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